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**THESIS**

**POSSIBLE CORRELATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL  
MILITARY OPERATIONS AND STATE STABILITY, AND  
APPLICATION TO STATE BUILDING IN IRAQ**

by

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March 2009

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**POSSIBLE CORRELATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS  
AND STATE STABILITY, AND APPLICATION TO STATE BUILDING IN  
IRAQ**

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## **ABSTRACT**

This thesis explores the possible correlation between participation by emerging states in multinational military coalitions, and increased stability of those emerging states. Level of multinational military participation is regressed against three metrics of stability; level of democracy, occurrence of internal conflict, and occurrence of external conflict. Implications of correlations discovered are discussed with respect to policy relevance toward state building and reconstruction in Iraq.

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## **LIST OF SYMBOLS, ACRONYMS, AND ABBREVIATIONS**

AFRICOM -	United States Africa Command
AOR -	Area of Responsibility
CENTCOM -	United States Central Command
CMF -	Combined Maritime Force
COCOM -	Combatant Commander
ISAF -	International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan
MNF-I -	Multinational Force - Iraq
MN OPS -	Multinational Operations
NATO -	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PACOM -	United States Pacific Command
SOUTHCOM -	United States Southern Command

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This work is dedicated to First Lieutenant Tim Price, USA, who went down standing up, trying to make the world a better place, and to Talib, Majid, and all the other officers and sailors of the Navy of Iraq, always to be remembered as shipmates who brought justification and meaning to the mission from which Tim never.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. INTRODUCTION

Since the end of the Second World War, the world has witnessed two striking events: the mass release of entire continents from colonialism, and the rise of the formalized international community embodied in the United Nations. Regions formerly colonized directly or as client satellites of parent powers have, in the last half century, proven to be a hot bed of regional conflicts, wars, revolts, and disputes. Since its first peacekeeping operation in 1948, the United Nations has subsequently performed over 60 multinational peacekeeping and observation operations<sup>1</sup>. Additionally, United States military operations since the Second World War have overwhelmingly centered on regional conflicts, and have been performed by multinational coalitions.

The end of the Cold War has brought about a dramatic shift in the composition of United Nations and United States-led coalitions, namely that participants are increasingly the nations that such operations were once directed against. Developing nations have participated in peacekeeping and multinational operations of increasing duration and complexity and in greater numbers. In ongoing United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, nations from Africa and South Asia are some of the largest contributors. Ongoing U.S.-led coalitions have seen greater and greater

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<sup>1</sup> List of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations since 1948: <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/list/list.pdf> (March 2009).

participation by regional allies in the Middle East, South and Central America, and Southeast Asia. Of course, the key question concerns the implications of greater numbers of emerging states participating in greater numbers of multinational coalition operations. Previous literature to be discussed in Chapter II concentrates primarily on reasons that emerging states choose to participate in such operations. This thesis will examine the lasting effects that participation may have on those states that do participate.

#### **B. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION**

As the globalization of peace and stability operations exposes more and more emerging states to international cooperation and the international system, it may be inferred that repeated exposure to such an environment may change a state over time. What effects repeated exposure to cooperative military operations may have on emerging states, for good or for ill, may have significant defense and foreign policy implications. As such, the major research question to be examined in this thesis is whether repeated participation in multinational military coalitions shows correlation with changes in levels of state stability.

In response to the major research question, three hypotheses may be presented. First, participation in multinational military coalitions may have little or no bearing on state stability. This hypothesis may be stated to be the least likely, as it is difficult to imagine that greater exposure by an emerging government to both other countries and an overarching international system would have no effect whatsoever. The second hypothesis that emerges is

that participation in multinational military coalitions improves state stability in the majority of metrics that may be used to measure state stability. This also is unlikely, as many aspects of government and state stability are fairly independent both from the mitigation of international exposure and from the general state of the armed force.

The most likely hypothesis, which will henceforth be considered the hypothesis of this thesis, to be proved or disproved, is that it is highly likely that participation in multinational operations may improve select metrics of state stability, but that other metrics may be unaffected.

### **C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY**

As the major research question seeks a correlation between the number of multinational military coalitions in which a given state participates and a change in that state's stability, the problem lends itself to linear regression.

In order to determine whether multinational operation participation affects some elements of state stability more than others do, research will be conducted as a series of several single variable linear regressions rather than one multivariable regression. A series of regressions, separated by individual metrics of stability may identify which metrics of stability are affected more than others. Separating regression sets by region may also identify regional trends or anomalies of possible correlations.

#### D. RELEVANCE

The central question of this thesis is of great relevance to international affairs. In the U.S.-led reconstruction of Iraq, the implications of multinational coalition and United Nations operations concerning state stability may offer insight as to the nature that reconstruction assistance to Iraq's government should take. A major focus of the U.S.-led effort at reconstruction of Iraq has been the attempt to create a stable and capable government. As such, a correlation between military participation in the international community and cohesion of an emerging state's government may have implications for what security cooperation efforts and training to Iraq's armed forces may produce the most favorable results for Iraq, the United States, and the Gulf region.

Additional implications for such a correlation between state stability and participation in Multinational Coalition Military operations may also be applied to the overarching goals of the 2007 U.S. Navy Global Maritime Strategy. The 2007 strategy places significant emphasis on building military capabilities and interoperability of regional allies to relieve the global burden on the U.S. Armed Forces. If encouraging emerging states to take ownership of their region and become more active as contributors to the international community would both provide them with benefits and increase stability, the advantage seemingly to United States policy would be twofold. Firstly, it would be easier to encourage states to take an active role in their region if concrete benefits to them can be demonstrated. Secondly, increasingly coherent spheres of regional

stability benefit the U.S. goals of stable sea and commercial lines of communication and reduced commitment of U.S. Expeditionary forces.

#### **E. THESIS CONTENT**

The thesis will subsequently be broken down into four sections. A review of previous literature on the subject of multinational operations has been conducted for background on the field of study, and it establishes the universally accepted benefits that small states may receive from multinational operations. The thesis examines the participation levels in multinational coalitions between 1996 and 2008, and participation levels with changes in three metrics of stability: democratization, reduction of internal conflicts, and reduction of external conflicts. Research design for the study will be explained in detail, outlining parameters, time period, countries, and multinational operations to be included in the study. This section will also describe construction of regressions, and the specifics of metrics of stability to be used. Actual results of the statistical analysis will be described in their own section, firstly with the results of regressions for all countries as a contiguous block, and then divided by region to identify regional trends. Lastly, policy implications of the results will be discussed, particularly with respect to the historical background of state building in Iraq, as well as with respect to current U.S. and Iraqi Defense Policy.

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## II. PREVIOUS LITERATURE

For a cohesive study, a frame of reference for multinational military coalitions and their effects on and benefits to participants must first be established. Previous research has examined in great detail the potential benefits to small and emerging states of participating in multinational military operations, as well as benefits to larger regions provided by formalized international organizations. In addition, present in much of the literature is the investigation of reasons why states may choose to participate. Though this thesis will focus on what actual results are brought about by multinational military cooperation, beliefs of governments as to what benefits they believe they will gain present a starting point for what metrics should be investigated.

Review of literature on the subject of participation in United Nations Peacekeeping and other multinational operations reveals a great deal of information on possible benefits to small nations incurred through participation in such operations. Consistent throughout the literature is the concept that small nations with minimal funding may obtain equipment, training, and even better pay for their armed forces by participating in United Nations-led coalitions. Additionally, though information is limited on whether or not states may actually receive increased legitimacy through participation in United Nations Operations, most literature on the subject agrees that the belief in such improvement is a key factor encouraging them to participate. A vast majority of literature on participation in United Nations Peacekeeping operations is also focused on why states choose

to participate and factors influencing their decisions. As such, information on the benefits to emerging states for their participation is presented, but is not the primary focus of the studies. Additionally, common throughout most of the studies is an apparent bias against states participating from self-interest, labeling them as free riders or seekers of greater international recognition, rather than the acceptance that such benefits to smaller states may improve their stability and prevent the need for future peacekeeping operations.

A useful reference describing why states may choose to participate in international coalitions is Ian Hurd's *Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics*. Hurd argues that there are primarily three reasons that states will participate in a larger international system, namely coercion, self - interest, and altruism.<sup>2</sup> Hurd describes coercion as "To the extent that states follow any international rules, or act as if they recognize any international obligations, they do so out of the fear that noncompliance may bring a painful sanction.<sup>3</sup> Implied in the statement is that participation may prevent painful sanctions. Additionally, Hurd refers to the example of states in the Holy Roman Empire as an example of weak states vulnerable to attack who sought to bolster their security through association as a part of a larger organization, applicable to small states in modern times contemplating participation in United Nations-led operations. Though Hurd's article does not specifically address United Nations

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<sup>2</sup> Ian Hurd. "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics." *International Organization* 53 (1999): 379.

<sup>3</sup> Hurd, 394.

Peacekeeping, his theories of broader international relations provide a framework for theory construction on possible effects of small state participation in United Nations Operations.

Commonly cited in literature on United Nations Peacekeeping operations is Laura Neack's article *UN Peacekeeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?* Neack examines whether the interest of the stability of the global community or self-interest are more likely to influence a state's decision to participate in United Nations operations. Neack argues that since the founding of the United Nations following the Second World War, many less powerful nations, referred to by Neack as the "middle nations"<sup>4</sup> have participated in United Nations Operations primarily to increase their own standing in the international community, and preserve their influence by contributing to an international system greater than stronger national powers. Additionally, Neack argues that "even 'small' or 'weak' powers may support the status quo,"<sup>5</sup> and also cites that three of the largest contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping have been India, Ghana, and Brazil, rising regional powers wishing to assert greater prominence in the international community.<sup>6</sup>

Further developing the reasons why a state participates in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, and indirectly, benefits a small state may reap from participation is Gerry Cleaver and Roy May's *Peacekeeping: The African Dimension*.

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<sup>4</sup> Laura Neack. "UN Peace-keeping: In the Interest of Community or Self?" *Journal of Peace Research* 32 (1995): 183.

<sup>5</sup> Neack 184.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., 185.

Cleaver and May seek to determine whether the region of sub-Saharan Africa would benefit from a firmer establishment of a peacekeeping organization of African States. Cleaver and May form the hypothesis, based on previous participation in United nations Peacekeeping Operations, with significant numbers of African nations contributing troops,<sup>7</sup> that regional stability of Africa would benefit from a more formal arrangement of African states for peacekeeping operations. Their final conclusion is that while significant problems must first be addressed, the region would benefit. Sandra Maclean's *Peacebuilding and the New Regionalism in Southern Africa*. Maclean argues that from the growing number of African nations that have gained experience through United Nations Peacekeeping Operations has come a new sense of regionalism, creation of multinational regional conflict management organizations, and countries taking ownership of their region in the international community has emerged.<sup>8</sup> Maclean, of all the articles reviewed, makes a compelling argument for the intangible benefits of participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, that exposure to such operations and repeated participation in the international community may lead to the taking on of greater responsibility by small and emerging states.

Lebovic's *Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations After the Cold War* seeks to determine the primary cause for state support of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations; whether a factor of the

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<sup>7</sup> Gerry Cleaver and Roy May. "Peacekeeping: The African Dimension." *Review of African Political Economy* 22 (1995): 490.

<sup>8</sup> Sandra J. Maclean. "Peacebuilding and the New Regionalism in Southern Africa." *Third World Quarterly* 20 (1999): 953.

level of democracy of the country, or of self interest. Lebovic quotes Neack's suggestion that middle and weaker powers may use participation in United Nations Operations to bolster their international recognition and influence.<sup>9</sup> Though the article centers, and successfully argues with that levels of democracy affect a nation's likelihood to participate in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, in the explanation of self-interest, Lebovic's article also indirectly reveals possible benefits to emerging states in return for participation. First, the research suggests that small or weak states may obtain significant military benefits from participation, chiefly better pay for their forces, equipment in the form of excess defense articles, and valuable training gained in real world operations for their forces.<sup>10</sup> Additionally, participation in certain operations may gain smaller or emerging nations the support of a larger power that may assist them in the future.<sup>11</sup>

A further examination of possible benefits of United Nations Peacekeeping operations is provided in Bobrow and Boyer's *Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations*. Bobrow and Boyer's study reinforce that small states may gain significant materiel and monetary benefits for their armed forces by participating in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Additionally, the article cites Neack's view that participation may result from a desire to maintain or enhance status in the international community, but calls into question whether or not that is

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<sup>9</sup>James H. Lebovic. "Uniting for Peace? Democracies and United Nations Peace Operations after the Cold War." *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48 (2004) : 911.

<sup>10</sup> Lebovic, 926.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 916.

necessarily bad. Bobrow and Boyer argue that while self-interest may be a significant factor leading to participation in United nations Peacekeeping Operations, greater participation in a legitimate international authority, whatever the reasons, may be of benefit to the collective good, stating

In our view, for UN PKO's and many other aspects of international affairs, it seems unhelpful to embrace absolute dichotomies - such as purely private versus public goods - which fail to distinguish intermediate possibilities of consequence.<sup>12</sup>

Of particular note is that Bobrow and Boyer accept that participation in Peacekeeping Operations, even for reasons of self-interest, may still be a positive trend.

Literature on participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations appears to be heavily weighted towards the reasons that states participate, and in a trend exemplified by Neack seem to ignore that individual benefits to small states may be to the advantage of the international community. Information on gains to small states is provided, as in order to describe reasons of self-interest, many articles provide indirect data on benefits small states might receive. Several of the articles mention the hard fact that small states providing military components to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations will receive the tangible benefits of monetary support, military equipment, and valuable real world training for personnel. While not specifically investigated as a benefit to small states, most

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<sup>12</sup>Davis B. Bobrow and Mark A. Boyer. "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (December 1997): 729.

articles agreed that a strong belief that their status in the international community would be improved impelled many states to participate in operations. Though least supported by hard evidence, articles on regionalism and the increased participation of African states showed the potential benefits to the international community of repeated participation in United Nations Operations, whatever their reason for participation. A great deal of research has been done on reasons why states participate in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, but the opposite, what are the positive and adverse consequences of participation, does not generate as much attention. While the articles examined did provide hard evidence of significant materiel gain for participating nations, the intangibles of state legitimacy and increased stability of a state by repeated participation in a legitimate international system were briefly touched, but not investigated in depth.

As a starting point for the research included in this thesis, most previous literature has touched on the fact that materiel gains for participation in multinational operations are a recorded fact. The literature has also suggested that greater international military cooperation by small states may also provide benefits in terms of regional stability. This thesis will determine if suggested regional benefits exist, by measuring correlation of participation in multinational military operations and stability. The study, though conducted first as a singular block of all countries, is also divided regionally into the COCOMs of AFRICOM, CENTCOM, PACOM, and SOUTHCOM to better identify trends of regional stabilization or destabilization. Individual reasons why states participate will not be investigated,

only the measurable effects and implications that said participation may have for state and regional stability.

### **III. RESEARCH DESIGN**

#### **A. INTRODUCTION**

From a historical perspective, in the Middle East in general and Iraq specifically, previous state building efforts that included creation of an internally focused military had disastrous results. In light of the previous far-reaching negative results of Iraq's domestically focused armed forces, and ongoing U.S.-led state building efforts, it is necessary to explore the possibility that the encouragement of an externally focused state security apparatus may improve state stability. Previous literature is fairly agreed that emerging states may gain excess defense articles, funding, and training through the participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and multinational coalitions. A natural relevant progression of previous research on peacekeeping operations is whether a correlation exists between state participation in multinational operations and improved state stability. Some aspects of state stability and cohesion are intangibles such as national identity, morale, acceptance of the rule of law without coercion, and international cooperation that are extremely difficult to measure. This study will review a wide variety of countries and will concentrate on three metrics of state stability; level of democracy, change in occurrence of internal conflict, and change in occurrence of external conflict.

## B. COUNTRIES

In order to ensure wide inclusion of extremely varied countries, 84 countries from the areas of responsibility (AOR) of the U.S. Combatant Commands CENTCOM, AFRICOM, SOUTHCOM, and PACOM. EUCOM was excluded due to the proximity and wide membership within the European Union and NATO that may unduly influence trends of democratization and stability.

Within the countries included in the study, the countries of CENTCOM, most closely related to Iraq in culture, demographics, and geopolitical issues, received the greatest proportional representation. Of 20 countries in the CENTCOM AOR, 17 have been included in this study, representing 85% of CENTCOM AOR countries.

CENTCOM COUNTRIES	
BAHRAIN	QATAR
EGYPT	SAUDI ARABIA
IRAN	SYRIA
JORDAN	TADJIKISTAN
KAZAKHSTAN	TURKMENISTAN
KUWAIT	UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
KYRGYZSTAN	UZBEKISTAN
OMAN	YEMEN
PAKISTAN	

The only nations of CENTCOM specifically excluded are Afghanistan and Iraq as countries still nominally under or NATO occupation, as well as Lebanon due to fairly active continuing conflict with Hezbollah.

After CENTCOM, the Unified Command most greatly proportionally represented is AFRICOM, with 36, or 67%, of 54 countries.

AFRICOM COUNTRIES		
ALGERIA	GAMBIA	NIGER
ANGOLA	GHANA	NIGERIA
BENIN	GUINEA	REP CONGO
BOTSWANA	GUINEA BISSEAU	RWANDA
BURKINA FASO	KENYA	SENEGAL
CAMEROON	LIBYA	SIERRA LEONE
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	MALAWI	SOUTH AFRICA
CHAD	MALI	TANZANIA
COTE DIVOIRE	MAURITANIA	TUNISIA
D. R. CONGO	MOROCCO	UGANDA
ERITREA	MOZAMBIQUE	ZAMBIA
ETHIOPIA	NAMIBIA	ZIMBABWE

With a large number of countries gaining independence from European colonialism, many countries of multi-religious or ethnic demographics, and the both Islamic and Arabic heritage of North Africa, trends of AFRICOM, as in CENTCOM, may be relevant to Iraq. Of particular note, all countries of North and Saharan Africa are included. Somalia has been specifically excluded as a failed state that has not had an operational government since 1991. Similarly, Sudan, though possessing cultural and demographic similarities, is excluded specifically due to the active Darfur conflict resulting in continuing UN Peacekeeping intervention<sup>13</sup>.

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<sup>13</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:  
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko> (March 2009).

The PACOM AOR is the least represented by proportion, with only 14 or 39% of 36 countries represented; however, the low proportion may be misleading. Specifically excluded are all countries with established military alliances with the U.S. extending to or before the Second World War; including Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. Also excluded, with the exception of the Philippines and Indonesia, are all Indian and Pacific Ocean island and archipelagic federations. China has been excluded as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and North Korea excluded as still being in a legal state of war, though in ceasefire, with South Korea.

<b>PACOM COUNTRIES</b>	
BANGLADESH	MYANMAR
CAMBODIA	NEPAL
INDIA	PHILIPPINES
INDONESIA	SINGAPORE
LAOS	SRI LANKA
MALAYSIA	THAILAND
MONGOLIA	VIETNAM

Countries of the SOUTHCOM AOR are represented at 55%, with 17 of 31 countries included in the study. As in the case of PACOM, Caribbean Islands are excluded, with Haiti excluded specifically because of nearly continuous UN Peace Keeping Operations in country since 1993.<sup>14</sup> Of mainland South and Central America, all countries but Suriname, Guyana, and French Guyana are included.

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<sup>14</sup> United Nations Peacekeeping Operations:  
<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko> (March 2009).

SOUTHCOM COUNTRIES	
ARGENTINA	GUATEMALA
BELIZE	HONDURAS
BOLIVIA	NICARAGUA
BRAZIL	PANAMA
CHILE	PARAGUAY
COLOMBIA	PERU
COSTA RICA	URUGUAY
ECUADOR	VENEZUELA
EL	
SALVADOR	

#### **C. MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS INCLUDED**

For the purposes of the study, multinational operations included may be divided into two categories: United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and U.S.-led coalitions. United Nations Peacekeeping Operations are fairly well documented, and a wealth of useful raw data is available on the United Nations Peacekeeping information page, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko>, with information sheets on all past and present United Nations Peacekeeping Operations that include duration of operation, authorized troop strength, and participating nations. Though specific numbers of individual country troop contributions are included in some more recent Peacekeeping operations information sheets, troop levels by country are not available for all operations and will not be included within the scope of the study. As a starting point for operations, this study will include operations only after 1996, used as a starting reference

point as the end of UNISOM II, the United Nations Peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Only operations with greater than 500 total personnel authorized troop levels are counted. Countries are considered participants if they provide either military or police personnel to a selected peacekeeping operation.

UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS		
OPERATION	LOCATION	DURATION
MONAU	ANGOLA	1997-1999
ONUB	BURUNDI	2004-2006
MINURCA	CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC	1998-2000
UNMEE	ETHIOPIA/ERITREA	2000-2008
UNAMSIL	SIERRA LEONE	1999-2005
UNSMIH	HAITI	1996-1997
UNTAET	EAST TIMOR	1999-2002
UNMISSET	EAST TIMOR	2002-2005
UNMIBH	BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA	1995-2002
UNTAES	CROATIA	1996-1998
UNPREDEP	FMR YUG REP OF MACEDONIA	1995-1999
UNIKOM	IRAQ	1991-2003
UNAMID	DARFUR, SUDAN	2008-2009
UNMIS	SUDAN	2005-2009
UNOCI	COTE DIVOIRE	2004-2009
UNMIL	LIBERIA	2003-2009
MONUC	DR CONGO	1999-2009
MINUSTAH	HAITI	2004-2009
UNMIT	TIMOR LESTE	2006-2009
UNFICYP	CYPRESS	1964-2009
UNIFIL	LEBANON	1978-2009

For U.S.-led operations, four large ongoing operations and one recent no notice contingency operation will be included in the study. Ongoing operations are the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

Afghanistan<sup>15</sup>, Multinational Force Iraq (MNF-I)<sup>16</sup>, U.S. Fifth Fleet Combined Maritime Force (CMF)<sup>17</sup>, and U.S. SOUTHCOM's Partnership of the Americas<sup>18</sup>. As an example of a large no-notice contingency coalition, Operation Unified Assistance, the 2004-2005 Indian Ocean tsunami relief will also be considered<sup>19</sup>. Data on participating nations is taken directly from cognizant Combatant Commander public affairs releases of the individual operations.

#### **D. METRICS OF STABILITY**

Change in state stability will be measured by three metrics, change in level of democracy, internal conflict, and external conflict. Change in level of democracy is taken from two respected sources of democracy assessments, the Bertelsmann Transformation index<sup>20</sup>, and Freedom House<sup>21</sup>. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index provides a fairly cohesive country score for the categories of Management Index and for Status Index. The change in country Status Index score is used in this study. The Bertelsmann Status Index score is a score from one to ten with one being lowest and ten highest. The score is a compilation of the averages of ten point

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<sup>15</sup> ISAF Contributing Nations:  
<http://www.nato.int/ISAF/structure/nations/index.html> (March 2009).

<sup>16</sup> 2005-2009 Iraq Weekly Status Reports Archive: <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/iraqstatus/index.htm> (March 2009).

<sup>17</sup> U.S. Fifth Fleet CMF page:  
<http://www.cusnc.navy.mil/mission/rhumblines.html> (March 2009).

<sup>18</sup> USSOUTHCOM Counter Drug information page:  
<http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/counterNarco.php> (March 2009).

<sup>19</sup> Operation Unified Assistance PAO release:  
<http://www.pacom.mil/special/0412asia/> (March 2009).

<sup>20</sup> Bertelsmann Transformation Index: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/11.0.html?&L=1> (March 2009).

<sup>21</sup> Freedom House Analysis:  
<http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=5> (March 2009).

scores for each of 12 subcategories within the Status Index divisions of Political Transformation and Economic Transformation.<sup>22</sup> Bertelsmann Transformation Index data is available from 2003-2008. Freedom House also assigns scores of country democratic status by year. Freedom House assigns each country two scores, one being political rights and one being civil liberties. Each is given a score of one to seven, with one being highest and seven lowest. The scoring of the two categories is derived from a question checklist of 10 questions pertaining to Political Rights and 15 pertaining to Civil Liberties. For the purposes of this study, both change in Political Rights and change in Civil Liberties are included.<sup>23</sup> Though the Bertelsmann Transformation Index is more comprehensive, it includes only 125 countries, with several countries of this study not evaluated, while Freedom House contains data on 193 countries with all countries of this study evaluated.

Data for both internal and external conflicts is taken from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. The Correlates of War Project was previously examined as a possible source of conflict data, but only includes completed data to 1997.<sup>24</sup> The Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRI) Armed Conflict Dataset v4 - 2008 provides data on armed conflicts from 1946-2007, and is used as the primary reference for conflicts as a metric in this study. UCDP/PRI defines armed conflict as "A contested

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<sup>22</sup> Bertelsmann Status Index methodology: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/37.0.html?&L=1> (March 2009).

<sup>23</sup> Freedom House methodology: [http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana\\_page=341&year=2008](http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=351&ana_page=341&year=2008) (March 2009).

<sup>24</sup> Correlates of War Available Datasets: <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/> (March 2009).

incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, at least one of which is a government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths.<sup>25</sup> As such, required conflict data for the study for both numbers of internal and external conflict is contained in the UCDP/PRIOR Conflict Dataset v4-2008. For the purposes of the study, conflict data is limited only from 1996-2007, and broken into two portions: 1996-2001, and 2002-2007. The difference in the number of internal and external conflicts between 2002-2007 and 1996-2001 is considered the change in internal and external conflicts of a given state.

#### **E. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS DESIGN**

Since the primary question of the thesis is whether a correlation exists between the independent variable of participation in multinational operations and dependent variables of the previously discussed state stability metrics, the question lends itself to systematic quantitative analysis. The study consists of five linear regressions of state stability metrics: change in the three measures of democracy, change in internal conflict, and change in external conflict versus the independent variable of the number of multinational operations of a given country. For change in level of democracy, one linear regression is performed for each standard of measure: change in Bertelsmann Status Index, change in Freedom House Political Rights score, and change in Freedom House Civil

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<sup>25</sup> UCDP/PRIOR Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook: Version 4-2008. Centre for the Study of Civil Wars, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIOR). Oslo, 2008, 3.

liberties score. Regressions of stability metrics versus multinational operation participation is performed using the SAS JMP7 software. Regressions are first performed on all countries of the study grouped together, then on countries divided by COCOM AOR in order to identify potential regional trends.

## IV. RESULTS OF ANALYSIS

### A. RESULTS: ALL COUNTRIES


When the results of regressions of the metrics of stability against number of multinational operations are viewed for all countries of the study as a cohesive block, several trends may be identified. Firstly, when all countries of the study are grouped together, a fairly strong correlation exists between participation in multinational operations from 1996-2008 and an improved Bertelsmann Status Index score for the period of 2003-2008. An estimated slope of .0398 exists between multinational operations and change in Bertelsmann status index exists. The coefficient indicates that on average, Bertelsmann Status Index will improve by .398 percent of the total Bertelsmann scale, per multinational operation in which a given country participates. The relationship between the x variable of total multinational operations and y variable of change in Bertelsmann Status Index also exhibits a probability of significance ( $\text{prob} > |t|$ ) of  $>.0001$ . This means that the chance of the correlation between the two variables occurring randomly is approximately one in 10,000. Further reinforcing the relationship between multinational operations and Bertelsmann Status Index is the ratio of total variance versus variance explained<sup>26</sup>, expressed henceforth in this study as  $r^2$ . In the regression of multinational operations versus Bertelsmann Status Index,  $r^2$

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<sup>26</sup> Edward R. Tufte. Data Analysis for Politics and Policy. Prentice Hall Inc. Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1974: 72.

is equal to .526, meaning that change in number of multinational operations explains 52.6 percent of change in Bertelsmann Status Index.

**Total Ops vs Change in Bertelsmann Score: All Countries**



<b>Parameter Estimates</b>				
Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
Total MN Ops	0.0398179	0.008644	4.61	<.0001


**Figure 1 Bertelsmann Score: All**

Of 16 countries with a recorded increase of greater than .75, or 7.5 percent of the total Bertelsmann scale, in their Bertelsmann Status Index score between 2003 and 2008, only two, Laos and Angola were not participants in any of the multinational operations included in the study. While a greater number had not participated in previous United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, all but Laos and Angola were currently involved in at least one current United Nations Peacekeeping Operation.

For the analysis of all countries as a group, an estimated slope of -.0029 exists between multinational operation participation and improved metrics of democracy as measured by Freedom House. The correlation is extremely weak; for each multinational operation, Freedom House Political Rights score improves by only .04 percent of the

total scale. Additionally, the correlation's probability of significance was greater than .802, meaning an 80 percent chance of the correlation occurring randomly.

**Total Ops vs. Change in Freedom House Political Rights Index: All Countries**  
 \*Negative Estimate indicates increase of Political Rights



Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
Total MN Ops	-0.002934	0.011699	-0.25	0.8026


**Figure 2 Freedom House Political Rights Index: All**

Where a much stronger correlation may be seen is in the regression of multinational operations versus change in Freedom House Civil Liberties index. An estimated slope of -.04 exists between multinational operations and civil liberties as recorded by Freedom House. The coefficient indicates that for every multinational operation, on average, Freedom House Civil Liberties Index improves by .5 percent of the total scale. The probability of significance of this correlation is  $>.0001$ , meaning that chances of random occurrence of this correlation is approximately one in 10,000. The  $r^2$  score for multinational operations versus Freedom House Political Rights score is .39, meaning that change in multinational operations explains 39 percent of change in Freedom House Political Rights Index. Despite the correlation discovered, it must also be noted that

throughout the 84 countries examined, 37 of 84 experienced an improvement in Freedom House Civil Rights Index, regardless of level multinational operations, while only six declined. Taken in conjunction with the  $r^2$  figure that multinational operations explain only 39 percent of the variation, improvement in civil liberties may be a global trend, independent of participation in multinational operations.

**Total Ops vs Change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: All Countries**

\*Negative Estimate indicates increase of Civil Liberties



**Parameter Estimates**


Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
Total MN Ops	-0.041254	0.008883	-4.64	<.0001

**Figure 3 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: All**

When all countries are analyzed as a group, correlations between multinational operation participation and change in number of internal conflicts is fairly weak. The probability of significance, .29, indicates a 29 percent chance that the correlation occurred randomly. While the trend is toward a correlation between participation in multinational operations and a reduction in number of internal conflicts, the estimate of correlation is barely perceptible; -.0075. For comparison, were the correlation significant and predictive, a given country would need to

participate in 133 multinational operations to reduce their internal conflicts by one. The low estimated slope coupled with a high probability of the correlation occurring randomly indicates that on average, for all countries studied, multinational operations do not influence internal conflict.

**Total Ops vs Change in Internal Conflicts: All Countries**




<b>Parameter Estimates</b>				
Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	-0.007517	0.00708	-1.06	0.2914

**Figure 4 Internal Conflict: All**

A very slight correlation of  $-.005317$  exists between participating in multinational operations and a reduction in number of external conflicts, but, as in the case of change in internal conflict, there is a low probability of significance. Though not as high a probability of random occurrence as in the case of internal conflict, probability is  $.0717$ , or a greater than 7 percent chance of random occurrence. Additionally the correlation of multinational operations and reduction in external conflict is inhibited by an extremely low n number. Within the scope of the study,

encompassing 84 countries over 12 years, only three interstate conflicts were recorded; Nigeria and Cameroon, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and India and Pakistan.

**Total Ops vs Change in External Conflicts: All Countries**




<b>Parameter Estimates</b>				
Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	-0.005317	0.002915	-1.82	0.0717

**Figure 5 External Conflicts: All**

#### **B. SEPARATED BY COCOM: CENTCOM**

In order to identify regional trends, the countries of the study have also been divided by COCOM area of responsibility and regressions run again. As previously discussed, due to cultural, historical, and demographic similarities, the COCOM region most applicable to Iraq is CENTCOM. In the evaluation of the regression of multinational operations versus change in Bertelsmann Status Index, an estimated slope of .0307 is evident. Unfortunately, its probability of significance, .0656, indicates that the correlation is not significant, with a greater than six percent chance of correlation occurring randomly.

**Total Ops vs Change in Bertelsmann Score: CENTCOM**



Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
Total MN Ops	0.0307407	0.015171	2.03	0.0656

**Figure 6 Bertelsmann Score: CENTCOM**

Examination of raw data sets reveals that Pakistan is an extreme outlier, with participation in 19 of the included multinational operations, yet recording a decrease of -.09 in Bertelsmann's Status Index Number. Several theories present themselves as to the reasons for Pakistan's outlier status. One explanation that occurs is that Pakistan and all South Asia may be outliers due to a regional peculiarity as in the case of the former French Indochina. This theory may be immediately refuted by examination of the other nations formerly comprising British India. Though Bangladesh is also an outlier, with many multinational operations yet still a decline in Bertelsmann Status Index, India and Sri Lanka are decidedly not. India's performance tends to support the hypothesis of participation in multinational coalitions correlating with increase in democracy; India had the highest participation level in PACOM, and also the greatest Bertelsmann Status Index increase. Sri Lanka, also an active participant, recorded a Bertelsmann Status Index increase of .41.

Another possible explanation for Pakistan's outlier status is that unresolved disputes with India may have been used as a pretext for lack of democratization and suppression of civil liberties in the interest of military necessity. This explanation may also be disputed by comparison with India. India has been Pakistan's opponent in said disputes, and if the disputes were the root cause of Pakistan's outlier status, it would stand to reason that India would face similar problems. Instead, as previously mentioned, India is, of PACOM countries included in the study, the most supportive of the theory that multinational operations and metrics of state stability may be related.

A final possibility exists, that Pakistan's decline in Bertelsmann Status Index between 2003 and 2008 is due to factors unique to Pakistan. A review of Bertelsmann's Country Report for Pakistan reveals that much of the decline in score is due to the combination of the military rule of Pervez Musharraf beginning in 1999. Additionally, the perceived weakness of his government in the aftermath of the 2005 earthquake and perceived catering to the U.S. created further dissent leading to justification for harsher security measures during Musharraf's rule.<sup>27</sup>

Pakistan is the most significant outlier of the CENTCOM region, and when Pakistan is excluded from the regression, a different picture emerges. In the absence of Pakistan, the correlation between participating in multinational operations and increased Bertelsmann Status Index becomes more pronounced, with an estimated slope of .05. Additionally, probability of significance increase to a one


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<sup>27</sup> Bertelsmann 2009 Pakistan Country Report: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/119.0.html?&L=1> (March 2009).

percent chance of the correlation being random. For this regression,  $r^2$  is equal to .86, indicating that change in multinational operations explains 86 percent of variation in Bertelsmann Status Index.

Unfortunately, the regression of multinational operations versus increase in Bertelsmann Status Index has a low  $n$  number that may affect results. With Pakistan excluded, the CENTCOM portion of the study includes 16 countries, but for Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, no Bertelsmann data was available for 2003, with data for Qatar unavailable for 2008 as well. Due to the low  $n$  number for CENTCOM countries with complete Bertelsmann data, more weight should be lent to the Freedom House measures of democratization.

**Total Ops vs Change in Bertelsmann Score: CENTCOM (Pakistan Excluded)**




Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
Total MN Ops	0.050815	0.017082	2.97	0.0126

**Figure 7 Bertelsmann Score: CENTCOM (Pakistan Excl)**

Evaluation of participation in multinational operations versus the Freedom House democracy metrics of Political Rights and Civil Liberties reveals the CENTCOM region to mirror closely the results of all the study countries evaluated as a group. For total operations versus Freedom

House Political Rights Index, probability of significance was greater than .24, meaning a greater than 24 percent chance that the correlation occurs randomly.

**Total Ops vs. Change in Freedom House Political Rights Index: CENTCOM**  
 \*Negative Estimate indicates increase of Political Rights



Parameter Estimates				
Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
Total MN Ops	-0.015968	0.013084	-1.22	0.2400


**Figure 8 Freedom House Political Rights Index: CENTCOM**

Correlation of level of participation in multinational operations and change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index registered an estimated slope of -.049, or a .7 percent improvement on the Freedom House Scale per operation. Unlike the correlation between multinational operations and Political Rights, probability of significance is much higher, .0348; only a three percent chance of the correlation occurring randomly. Additionally,  $r^2$  for this regression is .57, meaning that change in multinational operations explains 57 percent of change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index. The regression for Freedom House Civil Liberties was conducted with Pakistan included, and country data was available for all countries for the time period covered. As such, the regressions included all 17

CENTCOM cases, and may be more reliable than the low n number Bertelsmann regression.

#### Total Ops vs Change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: CENTCOM

\*Negative Estimate indicates increase of Civil Liberties




Term	Parameter Estimates
Total MN Ops	Estimated slope: -0.0499, Std Error: 0.021636, t Ratio: -2.31, Prob> t : 0.0348

**Figure 9 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: CENTCOM**

With respect to correlation of multinational operations and occurrence of internal conflict, correlation for the CENTCOM region appears slight. An extremely low probability of significance, .7381, indicates a 73 percent chance that this correlation occurred randomly. As in the case of multinational operations versus Bertelsmann Status Index for CENTCOM, review of raw data sets reveals Pakistan as an extreme outlier, with massive participation in multinational coalitions, but recording an increase of internal conflicts from the 2002-2008 period over the 1996-2001 period.

### Total Ops vs Change in Internal Conflicts: CENTCOM




Parameter Estimates				
Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	-0.005988	0.017596	-0.34	0.7381

**Figure 10 Internal Conflicts: CENTCOM**

When the regression of number multinational operations versus change internal conflict is performed with Pakistan excluded, still leaving 16 countries as included case studies, the correlation for CENTCOM region countries becomes pronounced and displays a much higher probability of significance. That probability was .044, meaning a four percent chance of random occurrence. Additionally, this regression's  $r^2$  is .59, indicating multinational operations explaining 59 percent of change in internal conflict. Lastly, with Pakistan excluded, CENTCOM becomes the only region in which correlation with reduction in internal conflict has probability of significance.

**Total Ops vs Change in Internal Conflicts: CENTCOM (Pakistan Excluded)**




Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	-0.039002	0.017737	-2.20	0.0440

**Figure 11 Internal Conflicts: CENTCOM (Pakistan Excluded)**

The regression of number of multinational operations versus change in external conflicts revealed little. Possible correlation was not possible to ascertain for the entire region, including Pakistan. All countries included within the study showed no change in number of external conflicts between the 1996-2001 period and 2002-2008 period.

**Total Ops vs Change in External Conflicts: CENTCOM**



**Figure 12 External Conflicts: CENTCOM**

### C. SEPARATED BY COCOM: AFRICOM

After CENTCOM, AFRICOM is next most applicable to Iraq. The AFRICOM region also provided the greatest number of countries to the study as a whole, with 36 countries out of the total 84. AFRICOM, with such a large portion of the countries included, was also a trendsetter. Of all the regions included in the study, AFRICOM by far had the strongest correlation between number of multinational operations participated in by a given state and improvement in Bertelsmann Status Index. Additionally, the correlation identified had the highest probability of significance of any region. AFRICOM also included two major outliers. Senegal, though boasting participation in 13 of the included multinational operations, had a drop of .27 in Bertelsmann status index between 2003 and 2008. At the opposite end of the spectrum, Sierra Leone, holding the highest increase in Bertelsmann Status Index of any country, an increase of 2.24, or 22 percent of the Bertelsmann scale, participated in only three of the operations included in the study. Despite Sierra Leone's low level of participation overall, all three operations are ongoing operations, and account for 33 percent of current United Nations Peacekeeping operations. An explanation to Sierra Leone's fairly rapid democratization and entrance to the international community may be the end of the civil war with the Revolutionary United Front in 2000.<sup>28</sup> Review of Bertelsmann's Sierra Leone information page reveals this to be the case.<sup>29</sup>

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
<sup>28</sup> Uppsala Conflict Data Program/Peace Research Institute, Oslo (UCDP/PRI) Armed Conflict Dataset v4 - 2008.

<sup>29</sup> Bertelsmann 2009 Sierra Leone Country Report:  
<http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/69.0.html?&L=1> (March 2009).

With respect to Senegal, Bertelsmann's Senegal country report reveals that the decline in scores was due primarily to government corruption specific to Senegal. Despite corruption leading to a decline of scores, the report also stated that Senegal's rule of law and democratic institutions were more stable than the norm for sub-Saharan Africa.<sup>30</sup>

AFRICOM, with the highest number of cases of any individual region, shows an estimated slope of .0746 between participation in multinational military coalitions and change in Bertelsmann Status Index. As in the case of all countries together, the probability of significance, .0001, indicates a one in 10,000 chance of the correlation occurring randomly. This correlation has an  $r^2$  of .68, meaning change in number of multinational operations explaining 68 percent of change in Bertelsmann Status Index.

**Total Ops vs Change in Bertelsmann Score: AFRICOM**



Term	Parameter Estimates			
TOTAL MN OPS	Estimated slope 0.0746353	Std Error 0.016971	t Ratio 4.40	Prob> t  0.0001

**Figure 13 Bertelsmann Score: AFRICOM**


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<sup>30</sup> Bertelsmann 2009 Senegal Country Report: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/82.0.html?&L=1> (March 2009).

In the regressions of multinational operations versus the Freedom House metrics of democracy: political rights and civil liberties, AFRICOM showed some of the strongest trends with highest probability of significance. AFRICOM's average improvement in political rights per multinational operation was the highest of any COCOM AOR. Additionally; AFRICOM was the only region where the regression of total operations versus change in political rights showed a high probability of significance, .0355, indicating that 3.5 percent chance of random occurrence of correlation. As such, AFRICOM, with the highest n number of cases, represents significant correlation between increased participation in multinational military coalitions and improvements of all measures of democracy used in this study. This finding would tend to support the previously discussed conclusions of Cleaver and May that African regional stability would benefit from greater formalization of African international military cooperation.

#### Total Ops vs. Change in Freedom House Political Rights Index: AFRICOM

\*Negative Estimate indicates increase of Political Rights



#### Parameter Estimates


Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	-0.042025	0.019211	-2.19	0.0355

**Figure 14 Freedom House Political Rights Index: AFRICOM**

Total operations versus change in civil liberties for the AFRICOM region also stood out among all other COCOMs. AFRICOM showed the greatest improvement in civil liberties per multinational operation participated in of any region, a estimated slope of -.0572, or improvement of .5 percent of the Freedom House scale per multinational operation. Probability of significance, .007 or a seven in 10,000 chance of random occurrence, was higher than that of any other region.

#### **Total Ops vs Change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: AFRICOM**

\*Negative Estimate indicates increase of Civil Liberties




<b>Parameter Estimates</b>				
Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	-0.057215	0.015466	-3.70	0.0007

**Figure 15 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: AFRICOM**

For AFRICOM, the only metric of stability that did not show a high probability of significance of correlation was change in occurrence of internal conflict. Change in internal conflict versus multinational operations was for AFRICOM, as for all other COCOMs with the exception of CENTCOM when Pakistan is excluded, barely perceptible, with a coefficient of -0.011. It had very low probability of significance, .37; a 37 percent chance of random occurrence.

**Total Ops vs Change in Internal Conflicts: AFRICOM**




<b>Parameter Estimates</b>				
Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	-0.011139	0.012473	-0.89	0.3779

**Figure 16 Internal Conflicts: AFRICOM**

Change in number of external conflicts versus multinational operations showed a greater correlation than that of internal conflicts for AFRICOM, with a fairly high probability of correlation significance. There is unfortunately a problem of low n number of conflicts; there were only two interstate wars in the AFRICOM region within the period and countries covered. As such, conclusions of the multinational operations versus change in external conflict regression will most likely not provide decisive results for any region. It should be noted though that those conflicts account for two of three interstate wars and four of six belligerent countries within the entire scope of all countries included in the study.

**Total Ops vs Change in External Conflicts: AFRICOM**



<b>Parameter Estimates</b>				
Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	-0.014684	0.007191	-2.04	0.0487

**Figure 17 External Conflicts: AFRICOM**

#### D. SEPARATED BY COCOM: PACOM

As a regional grouping, the PACOM AOR may be described as an entire region that is an outlier from the other regions examined. Of all regions in the study, PACOM displayed the weakest correlation between participation in multinational operations and an improvement in Bertelsmann Status Index score. These results may be due to outliers of two categories.

First affecting results are frequent participants in Southeast Asia with declining Bertelsmann Status scores despite significant multinational operation participation. Singapore, participating in six operations showed a decrease in Bertelsmann Status Index of .03, and Bangladesh, one of the most active participants in the study, with participation in 18 of 27 total operations, showed a decrease of .27. Thailand, participating in nine of the included operations, registered a Status Index decrease of .83, the second greatest decrease out of all countries with

Bertelsmann Status Index data available from 2003-2008. In reviewing specific Bertelsmann Country Reports for reasons for the Bertelsmann ranking of these countries, reasons for decline unique to each country are revealed, rather than regional trend. The largest reason cited in Bertelsmann's Country Report for Bangladesh's decline is aggressive government and military security measures to combat Islamic based militants.<sup>31</sup> When conducting a study applicable to stabilization of Iraq, this may seem disconcerting. However, two of the PACOM countries with some of the largest Islamic based militancy problems in the region, Indonesia and the Philippines, do not support that this is a universal trend. Indonesia and the Philippines were both active in a diverse array of multinational military coalition operations, and recorded .47 and .45 increase, respectively, in Bertelsmann Status Index. Thailand's decline in Status Index was stated in the Bertelsmann country report to be primarily due to government corruption of Prime Minister Thaksin, and resultant military opposition to him.<sup>32</sup> Singapore's decline, albeit fairly slight at .03, was justified by Bertelsmann's fairly unambiguously as

The city-state of Singapore and its thriving free market show tremendous economic success, but its political system is authoritarian and lacks genuinely democratic institutions. The Singapore government makes no secret of the fact that it considers Western-style democracy unsuitable for

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<sup>31</sup> Bertelsmann 2009 Bangladesh Country Report:  
<http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/123.0.html?&L=1> (March 2009).

<sup>32</sup> Bertelsmann 2009 Thailand Country Report: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/126.0.html?&L=1> (March 2009).

itself as a small city-state fighting for survival in an inhospitable and competitive environment.<sup>33</sup>

This would indicate that for Singapore, as in the case of Bangladesh and Thailand, Bertelsmann's recording of a decline in Status Index was due to country specific eccentricities, rather than a regional or larger trend.

At the opposite end of the outlier spectrum, all countries formerly comprising French Indochina – Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia –; showed significant increases in Bertelsmann Status Index, despite very little multinational operation participation. Vietnam and Laos both increased by greater than .5, or by 5% of the total Bertelsmann scale and participated in none of the multinational operations included in the study. Cambodia, with a .18 increase in Bertelsmann status index score, participated in one operation included in the study. According to Bertelsmann's country information pages, cited reasons for increases of Status Index in former Indochina countries fell mainly in two categories; applicable to all three countries, and Cambodia specific. Reasons specific to Cambodia included the end of Khmer Rouge and Cambodian Freedom Fighters insurgencies. All three countries exhibited a greater desire for economic cooperation and integration in greater Southeast Asia.<sup>34</sup>

Estimated slope is low, .0107, meaning a one tenth of one percent increase in the total Bertelsmann scale per multinational operation. The correlation displayed the


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<sup>33</sup>Bertelsmann 2009 Singapore Country Report: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/129.0.html?&L=1> (March 2009).

<sup>34</sup>Bertelsmann 2009 Asia and Oceania Report: <http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-index.de/457.0.html?&L=1> (March 2009).

lowest probability of significance of any region, .42, meaning a 42 percent chance that any correlation occurred randomly.

**Total Ops vs Change in Bertelsmann Score: PACOM**



Parameter Estimates				
Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	0.0107487	0.013133	0.82	0.4278


**Figure 18 Bertelsmann Score: PACOM**

PACOM also showed significant regional outlier status with respect to change in Freedom House Political Rights Index. Of the regions encompassed by the study, PACOM was the only region to show a correlation between participation in multinational operations and an average decrease in political rights. Also of note, in addition to merely the existence of the correlation between participating in multinational operations and an average decrease in political rights, the correlation's probability of significance, .04 or four percent chance of random occurrence, means that the correlation is significant. The  $r^2$ , .86, indicates that increase in multinational operations explains 86 percent of the decrease in political rights. These factors combined would indicate that in PACOM, greater participation in multinational operations inhibits political rights. Another plausible explanation may be that the result

stems from the combination of PACOM's low n number of cases, and the large percentage of outliers.

#### Total Ops vs. Change in Freedom House Political Rights Index: PACOM

\*Negative Estimate indicates increase of Political Rights




Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	0.059492	0.026546	2.24	0.0431

**Figure 19 Freedom House Political Rights Index: PACOM**

PACOM countries did show a similarity to other regions in multinational operations versus Freedom House Civil Liberties index, but correlation was still somewhat weak, at only -.018. The probability of significance, .284, indicates that this correlation is not significant at all, and had a 28 percent chance of occurring randomly.

### Total Ops vs Change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: PACOM

\*Negative Estimate indicates increase of Civil Liberties




Term	Parameter Estimates
TOTAL MN OPS	Estimated slope: -0.018717, Std Error: 0.01678, t Ratio: -1.12, Prob> t : 0.2849

**Figure 20 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: PACOM**

In possible correlation of operations versus conflict, PACOM displayed more similarities to the trend of other regions. PACOM showed a correlation between multinational operations and an overall reduction in internal conflict. Correlation was extremely weak, at -.008, with an extremely low probability of significance. The probability of significance, .65, indicates a 65 percent chance that any correlation at all occurred randomly. No PACOM countries reflected a change in external conflicts.


**Total Ops vs Change in Internal Conflicts: PACOM**



Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	-0.008021	0.017423	-0.46	0.6528

**Figure 21 Internal Conflicts: PACOM**

**Total Ops vs Change in External Conflicts: PACOM**




**Figure 22 External Conflicts: PACOM**

Overall, as a region PACOM was least supportive of the hypothesis that participation in multinational military operations may be linked to one or more metrics of stability. The region was first hindered by a marginal to low n number of cases, 14 of the total 84. Additionally, the region included six major outliers, divided into two diametrically opposed groups of three: active participants whose stability declined, and non-participants whose stability improved.

#### E. SEPARATED BY COCOM: SOUTHCOM

SOUTHCOM as a region, with 17 of the total 84 cases, tended to follow the trends of the study as a whole, but was unique in that none of the correlations displayed high probability indicating significance. SOUTHCOM showed a correlation of .027 for participation in multinational operations and improvement in democracy according to the Bertelsmann Status Index. Unfortunately, probability of significance, .0674, indicates that this correlation is not significant, and had a six percent chance of occurring randomly.

**Total Ops vs Change in Bertelsmann Score: SOUTHCOM**




Parameter Estimates				
Term	Estimated slope	Std Error	t Ratio	Prob> t
TOTAL MN OPS	0.0276837	0.013963	1.98	0.0674

**Figure 23 Bertelsmann Score: SOUTHCOM**

With respect to Freedom House measures of democracy, political rights and civil liberties, SOUTHCOM showed correlation but with even lower probability of significance than correlation with change in Bertelsmann Status Index. The probability of significance of .81 means that there is an 81 percent chance that any correlation at all occurred randomly.

### Total Ops vs. Change in Freedom House Political Rights Index: SOUTHCOM

\*Negative Estimate indicates increase of Political Rights




Term	Parameter Estimates
TOTAL MN OPS	Estimated slope: -0.006116, Std Error: 0.026429, t Ratio: -0.23, Prob> t : 0.8199

**Figure 24 Freedom House Political Rights Index: SOUTHCOM**

Correlation of participating in multinational operations and increase in civil liberties was more defined, -.03, but still not significant. The figure of .06 still indicates that the correlation is not significant.

### Total Ops vs Change in Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: SOUTHCOM

\*Negative Estimate indicates increase of Civil Liberties




Term	Parameter Estimates
TOTAL MN OPS	Estimated slope: -0.034659, Std Error: 0.017527, t Ratio: -1.98, Prob> t : 0.0655

**Figure 25 Freedom House Civil Liberties Index: SOUTHCOM**

Correlation of participating in multinational operations and change in number of conflicts was also equivocal. Number of operations showed a barely perceptible correlation, .001, with a decrease in internal conflicts, but with extremely high, 89 percent, possibility of random occurrence. No SOUTHCOM countries participated in interstate wars during the time period encompassed by the study.


**Total Ops vs Change in Internal Conflicts: SOUTHCOM**



Term	Parameter Estimates			
TOTAL MN OPS	Estimated slope	-0.001019	Std Error	0.007978

**Figure 26 Internal Conflicts: SOUTHCOM**

**Total Ops vs Change in External Conflicts: SOUTHCOM**



**Figure 27 External Conflicts: SOUTHCOM**

## R<sup>2</sup> FIGURES AND NUMBERS OF OBSERVATIONS

R SQUARED OF CORRELATES (MN OPS VERSUS STABILITY METRICS)					
REGION	Δ BERTELSMANN STATUS INDEX	Δ POLITICAL RIGHTS	Δ CIVIL LIBERTIES	Δ INTERNAL CONFLICT	Δ EXTERNAL CONFLICT
ALL	0.526*	0.29	0.39*	0.24	0.22
CENTCOM	0.869	0.722*	0.57	0.67	NA
PAKISTAN EXCLUDED	0.86*	NA	NA	0.59*	NA
AFRICOM	0.68*	0.36*	0.48*	0.32	0.45
PACOM	0.403	0.868*	0.63	0.47	NA
SOUTHCOM	0.728	0.545	0.68	0.33	NA

\*Statistically Significant: Prob>|t| .05 or less

Figure 28 R Squared Figures

NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS BY REGRESSION					
REGION	Δ BERTELSMANN STATUS INDEX	Δ POLITICAL RIGHTS	Δ CIVIL LIBERTIES	Δ INTERNAL CONFLICT	Δ EXTERNAL CONFLICT
ALL	74*	84	84*	84	84
CENTCOM	13	17*	17*	17	17
PAKISTAN EXCLUDED	12*	16	16	16*	16
AFRICOM	32*	36*	36*	36	36
PACOM	14	14*	14	14	14
SOUTHCOM	15	17	17	17	17

\*Statistically Significant: Prob>|t| .05 or less

Figure 29 Number of Observations by Regression

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## V. CONCLUSIONS

### A. CONCLUSIONS FROM RESULTS OF ANALYSIS

From the results of the regressions of level of participation in multinational operations versus metrics of stability several conclusions may be drawn. Firstly, and most pronounced, a strong correlation with extremely high probability of significance exists between participation in multinational operations and an increase in state level of democracy as measured by the Bertelsmann Status index. With all countries included, an n number of 84, the correlation has approximately a one in 10,000 chance of random occurrence. Also highly significant is the fact that based on the  $r^2$  figure of this regression, 52 percent of change in Bertelsmann Status Index may be explained by change in level of participation in multinational coalitions. The glaring implication is that level of democracy and rule of law, at least as recorded by the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, is likely to increase as a given state increases their participation in multinational operations.

Participation in multinational operations was not only correlated to increased democratization according to only one source either. Improvement in Civil Liberties index as recorded by Freedom House also showed a strong correlation with multinational military operations, also with approximately a one in 10,000 chance of random occurrence. Though the  $r^2$ , .39, is not nearly as high as correlation between multinational operations and Bertelsmann Status Index, the 39 percent of variance explained by change in level of participation is still a significant finding.

Correlation with Freedom House Political Rights index was nearly nonexistent. In all regions except AFRICOM, the slight correlations were not significant. That said, AFRICOM, the region with the highest n number of cases of any region, showed significant correlations between levels of multinational military operations and improvement in all measures of democratization. As previously stated, this finding supports the conclusions of Cleaver and May that Africa as a region will reap benefits in stability of more formalized structures of international cooperation. CENTCOM also showed significant correlation between improvement in civil rights and levels of multinational operations. However, with the outlier, Pakistan, excluded significant correlation also existed, lack of Bertelsmann data in 2003 for four Gulf States created a low n number. Three of those four countries are now included in the Bertelsmann transformation index, and at least two, Kuwait and Qatar are active participants or supporters to U.S.-led coalitions. As such, future research should continue to follow the change in Bertelsmann Status Index of these newly included countries. Overall, it may be very accurately stated that in researching possible correlation between participation in multinational operations and improvement of democracy a strong correlation was discovered. The correlation existed, with possibility of random occurrence measured in hundredths of one percent, in two out of three respected measures of democracy. Additionally, when the countries of the study were broken into regions the correlation was strongest in the two regions most applicable to Iraq.

Internal and external conflicts as metrics of state stability did not produce as overwhelming results as

democratization did. Occurrence of external conflict was particularly difficult, as in the 12 years covered by this study, only three interstate wars were recorded among the 84 case studies. Due to the extremely low n number; no results can be determined for possible correlation of levels of multinational military cooperation and occurrence of interstate wars.

With respect to correlation between participation in multinational operations and the stability metric of internal conflict, the result was also fairly clear, namely that for the majority of regions examined correlation did not exist. With all 84 countries grouped together, correlation was barely perceptible, and chance of random occurrence was extremely high. Divided by COCOM AOR, three of four regions also mirrored this result. What is significant though is that when Pakistan is excluded as an extreme outlier, CENTCOM, with 16 other cases besides Pakistan, becomes the only region where a strong and significant correlation may be seen between level of multinational operation participation and a reduction in internal conflicts. This correlation also showed a high  $r^2$  figure of .59, meaning that 59 percent of change in level of internal conflicts could be explained by change in level of multinational operations. It must also be noted that although not all regions other than CENTCOM showed strong or significant correlation between multinational operations and decrease of internal conflict, in no region was there any correlation, even insignificant, with an increase of internal conflict.

Despite highly significant findings of correlation between multinational military operations and metrics of

stability, several criticisms emerge. Criticisms of the study may be classified in three categories: duration, n number of cases, and diversification of data sources. Firstly, a possible criticism is duration. The time period encompassed in this study is only 1996-2008. Though a time period of great upheaval and change on the world stage, the 12 years of this study represent approximately one-fifth the time period that UN Peacekeeping Operations have taken place. A recommendation for future research would be to extend the time frame covered back to 1949, and include all United Nations and U.S.-led coalitions in that time period. Bertelsmann Transformation Index Data, beginning in 2003, may not be extended back farther, but may be followed forward in future research to record changes in countries, particularly the four Gulf States, for which data was unavailable in 2003.

Another potential criticism, at least for AORs other than AFRICOM, may be n number of cases. CENTCOM and SOUTHCOM both had 17 country cases, but PACOM, with only 14 cases, faced a low n number problem in each regression, compounded by a large number of outliers. To correct in future research a strong recommendation would be merely to rerun the study including all countries in the world for which all or a majority of required data exists. The inclusion of all countries would eliminate n a number problems, and confirm or deny whether the trend of increased democratization following increased participation multinational operations holds true worldwide. The inclusion of all countries and an expansion of duration of study may also assist in the low number problem of interstate wars, so that a more accurate

determination of correlation may be made between participation in multinational operations and occurrence of external conflict.

A last criticism may be diversification of sources. Though democratization as a metric of stability was measured by two respected sources, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index and Freedom House, data for conflicts, internal and external, came from only one source, the Uppsala Conflict Data Program. A wealth of information may be found in the Uppsala Conflict Data Program, but future research would benefit from a diversification of sources of conflict data for comparison. An excellent source of conflict data for future research would be the Correlates of War Project, when data through 2008 is released and becomes available.

Despite valid potential criticisms, the findings of the study, particularly with respect to correlation of multinational operations and increased levels of democracy, have serious implications. First and foremost, the high level and significance of correlation should be a signal that further research and continuance of this subject is highly warranted. Secondly, the findings do in fact have policy implications for state building in Iraq.

#### **B. PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS BY IRAQ AND STATED U.S. DEFENSE POLICY**

For all countries, the study determined that on average, increased levels of participation in multinational military coalitions contributes to increased democratization. For Iraq's AOR, CENTCOM, this correlation of multinational operations improved metrics of stability also extends to reduced numbers of internal conflict. This

in conjunction with the established fact of materiel gains for multinational coalition participation makes a compelling case that one way to bolster improvement and stabilization in Iraq may be to encourage greater participation as soon as is feasible. Also adding to this argument is the fact that on the whole, there was not even a correlation, much less causation, between increased multinational operations and a reduction in stability. In short, encouraging Iraq to participate in multinational coalitions and United Nations Peacekeeping Operations would most likely produce no adverse results, but has an excellent chance of producing one or more positive results.

Furthermore, inclusion of Iraq in multinational operations, independent of potential benefits to Iraq very much supports the intentions of official U.S. Defense Policy. Speaking specifically to U.S. strategy and policy in the Global War on Terrorism, the 2008 National Defense Strategy States the need for inclusion of allies fairly explicitly:

In concert with others, we seek to reduce support for violent extremism and encourage moderate voices, offering a positive alternative to the extremists' vision for the future. Victory requires us to apply all elements of national power in partnership with old allies and new partners.<sup>35</sup>

The passage makes fairly clear that "new partners" will play an essential role in the Secretary of Defense's vision of the Global War on Terrorism. The Secretary's vision is

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<sup>35</sup>The Honorable Robert M. Gates (ed.) "National Defense Strategy." USDOD Publication. June 2008, 8.

further expanded in the section entitled "Strengthen and Expand Alliances and Partnerships," stating,

The United States also must strengthen and expand alliances and partnerships. The U.S. alliance system has been a cornerstone of peace and security for more than a generation and remains the key to our success, contributing significantly to achieving all U.S. objectives. Allies often possess capabilities, skills, and knowledge we cannot duplicate. We should not limit ourselves to the relationships of the past. We must broaden our ideas to include partnerships for new situations or circumstances, calling on moderate voices in troubled regions and unexpected partners.<sup>36</sup>

Focus on calling on "unexpected partners" fits the situation of Iraq very well. Even in the absence of further evidence of a causal relationship between multinational operations and state stability, the inclusion of Iraq in such operations and initiatives as Iraq's armed services become more capable meets the officially stated guidance of the Secretary of Defense. Inclusion of Iraq's armed forces in multinational operations may provide a two-pronged attack, both meeting the Secretary's guidance of the need for greater reliance on new "unexpected partners," and also potentially furthering U.S. goals of stability in Iraq.

Despite the theoretical nature benefits to the National Defense Strategy of the inclusion of Iraq, the fact remains that Iraq has already been included in at least one theater of multinational operations. The 2007 Maritime Strategy states:

Expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contribute to the security and

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<sup>36</sup> Gates, 15.

stability of the maritime domain for the benefit of all. Although our forces can surge when necessary to respond to crises, *trust and cooperation cannot be surged.*<sup>37</sup>

The 2007 Global Maritime Strategy's posture on international cooperation and its application to Iraq is highly significant for an extremely important reason; at the time of the strategy's publication, multinational operations had been underway between the Fifth Fleet's Combined Maritime Force and Iraq's Navy for greater than three years. Greater inclusion of Iraq in multinational maritime operations as a means of greater international inclusion for Iraq has several advantages. First and foremost, as previously stated, real world combined operations including Iraq's Navy are and have been underway for nearly five years. Secondly, perceived importance of maritime security is high to Iraq, as the majority of Iraq's economy is based on overseas sale of oil. Lastly, a framework for integration of emerging states into an effective maritime coalition already exists in the U.S. Fifth Fleet's Combined Maritime Force. A strong recommendation that would most likely not cause harm, and may bring about large returns would be the widening of the already existing inclusion of Iraq's Navy in Fifth Fleet maritime security operations, even outside of the Arabian Gulf as soon as is feasible.

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<sup>37</sup> General James Conway, Admiral Gary Roughead, Admiral Thad Allen (ed.). "A Cooperative Strategy for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Seapower." USDOD Publication. October 2007, 11.

**C. PARTICIPATION IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS BY IRAQ AND STATED IRAQ DEFENSE POLICY**

In addition to greater participation by Iraq in multinational operations supporting the intent of U.S. Department of Defense Guidance, greater participation also fulfills intent of Iraq's National Security Strategy. A significant portion of Iraq's National Security Strategy is dedicated to cooperation with other nations and Iraq's role in the international community. One section, specifically entitled "Reinforcing the participation of Iraq in the United Nations and international fora," gives insight that if Iraq were asked by the United Nations to contribute forces, initially in small numbers, to Peacekeeping, such request might be met favorably. The statements, "Iraq is an active and founding member of the United Nations. Iraq has substantial international commitments and active participation is one of the bases of the United Nations,"<sup>38</sup> and section (d) thereof, "Participation in all the international organizations that respect the Iraqi people as part of the United Nations,"<sup>39</sup> suggest that requests for greater participation in United Nations operations and initiatives might even be viewed as a matter of national pride. Because of said evidence that that increased international military participation might be viewed favorably by Iraq, a recommendation may be made that through diplomatic channels, Iraq might be approached about sending initially small numbers of volunteer military and police personnel to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. The

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<sup>38</sup> Republic of Iraq Cabinet. Iraq First: Iraqi National Security Strategy. Baghdad: 2007, 20-21.

<sup>39</sup> Republic of Iraq Cabinet, 21.

existing communication structure under the Fifth Fleet Combined Maritime Force also provides a channel by which Iraq could be approached with regards to expansion of multinational military participation.

Above all, the need for greater inclusion of Iraq in multinational coalition operations in as timely a manner as possible cannot be overstated. Regardless of the results of this study, inclusion of Iraq in such operations supports official policy of both the U.S. and Iraq. Beyond support of policy, it is also, as recorded by previous literature, a means of procuring funding, materiel, and effective training. Lastly, the results of this study do support that on average, participation in multinational military coalitions does positively affect democratization. In CENTCOM, participation positively affects incidence of internal conflict as well. It is by no means a certainty that Iraq's participation in such operations would rapidly affect the country's stability, but the examination of that ambiguity produces a fairly well defined cost benefit choice. It is highly unlikely that such participation would cause any harm, and highly likely that such participation would be of great benefit, to Iraq, to the U.S., and to the CENTCOM region.

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